1992-10-06 - re: Nuts & Acorns

Header Data

From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 3fd0e544238de7181d76d863b77743d4ae1d3dc88e4eaee330999abcb62314cc
Message ID: <2654.2AD20C59@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1992-10-06 22:11:44 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:11:44 PDT

Raw message

From: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 92 15:11:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Nuts & Acorns
Message-ID: <2654.2AD20C59@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > To: Tom Jennings
 
tj>>
I am considering becoming and "introducer" for parts of FidoNet. I
can't seem to get past the problems of how to assign reliability to
public keys I receive over an unsecured email channel to begin with.
No other method is practical.
<<
 
>>??
Huh?  I don't understand what you're pointing out.  If I send you my
public key -- even if I cc: dockmaster -- what does it matter that the
NSA knows my public key (unoless they want to send me msgs, too)? 
<<

Not my worry. What I meant was, how do I know htat the keyfile I
received from "John Smith @ net address" really is his, and not some
faker. Short of physically getting key disks from someone face to
face (flatly im-possible here), I don't know.

The assurance of course is the social system: if someone sends me a
message and keyfile, "here's my file, my name is Eric Hughes", and I
distribute it...

I can think of no way to prevent this, other than let a social system
detect and repair -- "HEY THATS NOT ME!!!" form the 'real' you would
raise a flag... and an audit trail at the introducers site
(dangerous...!) might help.

Anyhoo, that's what I meant.
--- RM version 0.-1 (watch out)
--  
Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings
INTERNET: Tom.Jennings@f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





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