1993-01-10 - Politics of Rmailers

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From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
To: uunet!netcom.com!norm@uunet.UU.NET
Message Hash: d97157badde2b213e0e6a79686f7197eb6cca7a43ef3872d8e9a20c24feb5897
Message ID: <9301100731.AA10229@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Reply To: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1993-01-10 07:56:14 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:56:14 PST

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From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:56:14 PST
To: uunet!netcom.com!norm@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301100731.AA10229@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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	 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:01 -0800
	 From: uunet!netcom.com!norm (Norman Hardy)

	 I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
	 all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
	 correctly identifies the local name of the sender.

I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
the grain of how the systems are used.

	 remailers: They require operators of remailers to be sympathetic
	 with the ends of the users of remailers. This obviously does not

Are there other reasons to use a remailer besides anonymity?  I can't
think of any, so that solves the sympathy problem.  If a remailer
operator conspires to reveal who you are that's a different issue, and
is solved (or reduced a lot) by using a chain of remailers.  Then
*all* of the remailers have to be compromised to reveal that
connection from source to destination.

dean





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