1993-04-07 - Re: WB: public kiosks

Header Data

From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 60457fe53b46bb98282f2253b07d165b62e368d1d238d4cbadac63df020d4e7d
Message ID: <9304070100.AA23113@servo>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-04-07 01:00:45 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:00:45 PDT

Raw message

From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:00:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <9304070100.AA23113@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Public kiosks are OK as a simple and moderately effective technique for
>assuring anonymity, and they're ideal for a security-naive person who
>is unable to verify the security of a more complex system.  But for
>my own use, I am much more confident in the security guarantee given by
>encryption on a portable computer and anonymizing using Chaum-style
>remailers...

Indeed. By definition, a public kiosk is in a public area, with open
access to all including the Bad Guy's agents and investigators. And
tracking people's physical movements in public places is an art that
investigators have had many years to refine and perfect. Many more
than, say, factoring large RSA public keys...

Phil







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