1993-04-21 - The Family Key

Header Data

From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Message Hash: 78365c7c3fbe5b3d5fa9ae40c3d843d94b9cf0ab7a011d16d61b90b8399d4f5f
Message ID: <199304211229.AA28337@sun.Panix.Com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-04-21 12:29:39 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 05:29:39 PDT

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From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 05:29:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: The Family Key
Message-ID: <199304211229.AA28337@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the largest weakness in the whole Clipper scheme, and
I am not sure If I am right about this is,....

The NSA knows the family key (the key that is built into each
chip; or perhaps large meta batch of chips).

The family key encrypts the Law Enforcement Block [LEB] of the message,
which contains the serial number for the chip in the device
being used to communicate. This key is known to NSA.

Thus, the NSA will be able to maintain an active traffic pattern
analysis of ALL communications sent via the Clipper chiped devices.

I think in many ways that traffic watching can and does often reveal
more information about someone than at time listening in to what
is actually being said.

The big point here is the the press release claims that the Clipper
chip doesn't provide anything more than what Law Enforcement already
has. That is not true. What they get is a complete serialized,
accurate method of traffic analysis.

Note: Denning claims that a proper order to wire tap an encrypted
communication will be "gotten" prior to decoding the LEB. Then a
second batch of paper work will be processed once the serial number is
revealed to get the encrypted/escrowed keys.


-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991




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