From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 17:40:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A definite trend
Message-ID: <s6ey5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I've been very busy this week busting my chops on a networking
project for a client, but I have to take a moment to add my own
few comments.
 
I realize that this is old news to some of you, but it appears that
many of you seem to forget that a rather unpleasant trend seems to
be developing within the law enforcement community. While we are
voicing our opposition to the "Key-Escrow" proposal (known to
most of us as Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack),  there are other historical
instances which are directly proportionate to where the LEAs are in
relationship to their efforts at legislating technology. The point that
I am attempting to make is that the "Key-Escrow" initiative is but
another extension of the earlier Digital Telephony proposal introduced
early last year (also known as "Son of S. 266"). As far as I'm
concerned, the "Key-Escrow" initiative is an attempted continuance of
a failed effort.
 
Excerpted from "Digital Media: A Seybold Report," April 20 1992 volume
1, number 11, page 7, is one of the first reports of this failed
attempt to legislate LEA access to communications on a broad scale -
 
"Though not specifically listed as a target in the proposal, many people
are calling Digital Telephony 'Son of S. 266,' a failed Senate bill that
required the same 'dumbing-down' for encryption as the F.B.I.  proposal
does for phone systems.  In other words, makers of encryption devices or
software were to be required to leave a 'back door' open for
law-enforcement and security agencies that wanted to decode encrypted
communication.
 
"The bill, of course, completely defeats the purpose of encryption -
leaving the 'back door' open for the very same sophisticated
techno-criminals that the agencies were trying to thwart.  S. 266 was
shouted down last year by outraged computer experts and civil
libertarians.
 
"At the CFP [CFP II - PF] conference, encryption expert Whitfield
Diffie said, 'I understand why the police don't like [encryption].
But a very large part of the essence of a free versus totalitarian
society consists of the difference between being answerable for
your actions and being subject to prior restraint against actions
the society doesn't approve of.'"
 
[End of excerpt]
 
Additionally, later in the article, a summary list is provided which
outlined the proposal, which is excerpted below -
 
"The F.B.I.  proposal
 
The following is taken directly from a Federal Bureau of Investigation
document distributed to legislators and other concerned parties in
Washington, DC.
 
Digital Telephony:
 
Summary of Issues
 
* The F.B.I.  utilizes electronic surveillance (wire taps) in virtually
  every area of its investigative responsibilities.
 
* The telecommunications industry, which remained virtually unchanged
  for approximately 50 years, is now rapidly changing to address the
  need for more advanced telecommunications systems, such as personal
  communications networks, advanced cellular and integrated services
  digital networks (ISDN) which have the capacity for high-speed
  transmissions of video, voice and data.
 
* One of the telephone telecommunications industry's major
  developmental efforts is to provide total digital connectivity (end
  to end) for its subscribers, including residential and business
  communities, in the near future.
 
* At present, no capability exists to intercept ISDN (digital)
  transmissions; therefore, the emergence of digital telecommunications
  technology will preclude the F.B.I.  and all of law enforcement from
  being able to intercept electronic communications, thus all but
  eliminating a statutorily-sanctioned, court-authorized and
  extraordinarily successful investigate technique.
 
* The Department of Justice and the F.B.I.  have been working with
  the White House, various Administration agencies, the
  telecommunications industry and Congress to find a workable solution to
  this very serious problem that endangers the safety of the American
  public.  A legislative solution has been developed to ensure that the
  legitimate need for law enforcement to lawfully intercept 
communications
  is met by the telecommunications industry.
 
Legislative Remedy
 
The proposal would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to require
providers of electronic communications services and private branch
exchanges to ensure that the Government's ability to lawfully intercept
communications is unimpeded by the introduction of advanced digital
telecommunications technology or any other emerging telecommunications
technology.  Specifically, the amendment provides the following:
 
1.  The FCC, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall determine
the technological interception needs of the Government and issue
regulations that will preserve the Government's ability to conduct
lawful electronic surveillance.
 
2.  The FCC shall issue regulations within 120 days after enactment
requiring the modification of existing telecommunication systems if
those systems impede the Government's ability to conduct lawful
electronic surveillance.
 
3.  Compliance by service providers and private branch exchanges will
be required within 180 days of the issuance of the regulations and the
use of non-conforming equipment is prohibited thereafter.
 
4.  The FCC has the authority to compensate (through rate structure)
telecommunication system operators under FCC jurisdiction for
reasonable costs associated with required modifications of existing
telecommunications equipment or technology.
 
5.  The Attorney General has specific authority, in addition to that
already vested in the FCC, to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief
for non-compliance."
 
[End of excerpt]
 
Of course, this bill died on "The Hill" because of lack of support. It
does suggest, however, that this is the tell-tale sign of a
continuing effort by the law enforcement community (which is grasping
at straws) to find ways to exploit domestic communications due to the
increasing complexity of technological advances in that area. LEAs are
also using highly volatile topics as drug enforcement and terrorism as
justification. While being politically correct, this does not justify
the scrutiny of private communications without reasonable
justification.
 
Hey -- you don't have to get whacked across the head with a 2x4 to see
the writing on the wall.
 
Clipper is an offering by a kinder, gentler government.
 
Clipper/Capstone offers a method to secure your communications for you,
with a "Key-Escrow" system, a GW (Gee Whiz) chip set whose internals
are classified and a premise of good faith. I'm certainly no sage with
a crystal ball, but I can't help but wonder which trump card will be
played next.
 
Whatever it is, I get the feeling that it is not good.
 
Cheers.
 
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.