1993-08-03 - Re: Skipjack Panel

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From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: a28b3486ab40e5fa8069fee7acd1fb9ad3040753a968c95bd6b32267e1521880
Message ID: <9308021853.AA11158@anchor.ho.att.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1993-08-03 01:32:39 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 18:32:39 PDT

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From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 18:32:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Skipjack Panel
Message-ID: <9308021853.AA11158@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I'll disagree with Mr. Thug.  It probably *is* in the interests of
the National Spook Agency to have the SkipJack algorithm secure;
they've taken too much heat in the past for DES, and if they can't
convince enough of us that we can trust them, we'll all use real
encryption products from independent vendors, or at least triple-DES.

The Key Escrow business strikes me as major sleight of hand,
but even if they don't steal the keys somewhere in that process,
they can change to rules so they can get them from the experts.
Obviously they could hide weaknesses anywhere in the system,
but the SkipJack part is pretty clean, and trapdoors in the chip itself
are a lot of trouble to use compared to the escrow process.

Right now they're trying to draw everybody's attention to the
foot-thick concrete walls and roof, and the final release of the report
will emphasize the heavy steel door with the big bulletproof
neon sign saying "COPS ONLY" and the elaborate ceremony for 
opening the two case-hardened real-estate-agent locks on the doors,
so you forget to notice that they've already made a spare copy of the key,
and maybe you can pop the unbreakable titanium pins out of the hinges as well.

			Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




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