1993-10-06 - Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?

Header Data

From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 3ee907911c8fcf2dda9f23c7296355c21a507c12a7bd77f6985f68617e830f93
Message ID: <9310060504.AA20656@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Reply To: <9310060253.AA19384@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1993-10-06 05:05:18 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:05:18 PDT

Raw message

From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:05:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?
In-Reply-To: <9310060253.AA19384@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310060504.AA20656@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu wrote:
>
>  This could refer to observer based protocols. I don't see anything in the
>above paragraph to indicate that they have invented a digital coin. I don't
>see how offline non-observer based cash could possibly work. (e.g.

The other paper at CWI "Single Term Off-Line Coins" (which I have read
but haven't really studied in depth) isn't an observer based protocol.

Ferguson represents cash as 3 numbers.  When Alice wants to spend, she
gets two RSA-signatures from the bank (which are derived from the hash
functions and the 3 numbers).  Alice pays by sending the 3 numbers to
the store, which replies with a challenge, which she responds to using
information derived from both signatures.  She can spend several coins
by using the same challenge and sending the product of her responses
to the store.  At the end of the day, the bank sends the 3 numbers,
the challenge and response to the bank, which then verifies the
credit.

If Alice spends a coin twice, she allows the bank to determine her
identity.  (The bank must make sure the penalty is severe enough to
discourage this behavior).  One nice feature is that it is very
difficult (infeasible) for the bank to frame Alice and claim she
double spended.

It seems from this paper, and I think one other I read, that offline
protocols presented cannot prevent double spending but rather reveal
the identity of such a person.

--
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories




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