From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:19:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Signing our keys
Message-ID: <4812.9310281817@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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an41418@fi.penet.anon (wonderer) writes:
>It seems to me that we have an interesting dilemma
>here. If we are willing to sign a key based on an
>entity that we KNOW does not really exist, then what
>does a signature mean? You have been an active and
>productive participant on cypherpunks for quite some
>time now, so if that's what I'm saying by signing
>your key, then I would be willing to. Off line methods
>wouldn't work in this case because we aren't real.

Certification establishes a relationship between a public key and a True
Name.  When there is no True Name, or the True Name is not to be revealed,
certification is irrelevant.  For a nym to prevent anyone else for
masquerading as itself, it should announce a public key in its first
appearance on the net, and thereafter sign every message with its private
key.  This guarantees that all such messages emanate from those with access
to the private key.  Certification is irrelevant.

What does become difficult for a nym is key revokation.  If the nym's
private key is compromised, anyone with access to it can send a message
purporting to revoke the key and announcing a new one.  Such a revokation
cannot be certified unless its issuer not only reveals their True Name but
somehow establishes to the satisfaction of whoever is certifying it that
they are the True Name of the nym.

Or as someone put it more succinctly, keys *are* the identities of the
future net.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.