1994-01-20 - alternative to Fair Cryptosystems

Header Data

From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: ba6346c0de891ef247e26b82e6d1d4ee7f7679d593e23e1e2cb502de8e021c02
Message ID: <199401201628.LAA02129@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-01-20 16:29:16 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 20 Jan 94 08:29:16 PST

Raw message

From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 94 08:29:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alternative to Fair Cryptosystems
Message-ID: <199401201628.LAA02129@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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I'm slow reading my cp mail and saw a reference to Micali's Fair Cryptosystems
(what a name!).  There is a simple alternative -- also to Clipper.

You can have your surveillance agency (or agencies which need to cooperate)
publish their own RSA keys (big ones, presumably), and all the good little
boys and girls who want to prove how obedient and conformist they are can
include those keys as recipients when they encrypt messages.  If there are
to be multiple agencies which have to cooperate, the PGP or RIPEM software
would have to change to split the message key by XOR with ranno pieces,
but in the meantime, you could just include the FBI in your list of recipients
and save everybody the hassle of having to get pieces to put together.

Simple -- direct -- speaks right to the gov't desire.  What could be wrong
with this?

 - Carl


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