1994-02-01 - Matsui-san Attack

Header Data

From: buckley@wti.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 21302600155e78ef631546047b6488f042bfc7ecf15e70e8f9d0ef61e49d7475
Message ID: <9401312111.AA15451@atlanta.wti.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-01 01:55:26 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 17:55:26 PST

Raw message

From: buckley@wti.com
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 94 17:55:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Matsui-san Attack
Message-ID: <9401312111.AA15451@atlanta.wti.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



]> A bigger problem is that PEM uses DES rather than IDEA.  I just learned
]> of a new attack by Mitsuru Matsui of Mitsubishi that requires 2^43
]> *known* plaintexts, not chosen ones.  The note I received says that it
]> ``breaks the scheme in 50 days on 12 HP9735 workstations''.  This was
]> presented last week at the Japanese Conference on Cryptography and
]> Information Security.

50 days on 12 HP9735 = 600 days on a single HP9735
The 735 has a pretty fast Mflop rating (compared to Sun, IBM, SGI, PC, and
Macs).  Using a comparable breaker on the average machine, it is going
to take two years to "break the scheme".
That leaves two years to create stronger/tighter strategies.





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