1994-02-03 - Re: New remailer up.

Header Data

From: qwerty-remailer@netcom.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 6ee62549e99ae51679a754911845a15b6ec14d3eaadde7db8a096677575762e0
Message ID: <199402030131.RAA20660@mail.netcom.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-03 01:31:14 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 17:31:14 PST

Raw message

From: qwerty-remailer@netcom.com
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 17:31:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: New remailer up.
Message-ID: <199402030131.RAA20660@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sure, a vanilla user at netcom probably can't track the remailer logs,
unless of course there are BUGS in SENDMAIL (gasp!) or SunOS or whatever.
But remailers aren't just to keep random users from knowing who you are
so you can post better anonymous letters to alt.sex.anonymous.
At least some of us would like real privacy, and consider remailers
a useful part of this, and this means that if you're using remailers
to communicate with your sources for the newspaper article you're writing
on the CIA's cocaine delivery shortfalls or the NSA/Trilateralist designs for
the National Health Care ID Card or your mayor's child pornography habits,
that nobody can track you or your sources down easily.
That means that root@netcom.com can't do it using the root password,
even if they want to comply with the subpoena, and the Secret Service
can't do it after confiscating netcom's machines or wiretapping their phones.

Non-encrypting remailers can never really get that good, but they can
at least d part of the job, and encrypting remailer networks may get
that good if there's enough traffic through the system.

So meanwhile, are you giving root@netcom.com permission to try to
identify the source of your mail and win the $20 for finding out
whether you're really Xenon or you're really L.D.'s evil twin Skippy?
(No idea if they'll try, or if they're even listening....)

					- Radon
					





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