1994-02-07 - A Nice Summary of Motives for Clipper

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From: Patrick_May@dtv.sel.sony.com (Patrick May)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f7c82e19eb17ce83f6f20100fcfc9ccc88b2f9128a3dabbc605d8feefbaeea08
Message ID: <9402072329.AA24031@hugehub>
Reply To: <199402061911.LAA20333@mail.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-02-07 23:36:30 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 7 Feb 94 15:36:30 PST

Raw message

From: Patrick_May@dtv.sel.sony.com (Patrick May)
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 94 15:36:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Nice Summary of Motives for Clipper
In-Reply-To: <199402061911.LAA20333@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9402072329.AA24031@hugehub>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May writes:
> [Explanation of why Clipper will be prevalent in five years
>  deleted.]

     Mr. May's arguments are eloquent and convincing as usual, but it
occurs to me that one important point is being overlooked in this
discussion: the algorithm will not be a secret forever.

     Even in the worst case scenario, where all major players in the
industry knuckle under to the government (including those currently
planning to use other systems), the situation will be resolved as soon
as either Clipper or one of its designers is reverse-engineered.  The
more widespread is the chip, the greater the blow to the government.
With the algorithm known there is no way to prevent compatible,
non-escrowed, devices from being used, and it would be costly and
embarrassing to attempt to recall 100 million "secure" chips.

     So, how long will we likely have to put up with this abomination?

Regards,


Patrick May     (no known relation, tentacular or otherwise)





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