1994-03-13 - Barlow v. Denning on AOL (OFFICIAL)

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From: rarachel@prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
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UTC Datetime: 1994-03-13 23:25:39 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 15:25:39 PST

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From: rarachel@prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 15:25:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Barlow v. Denning on AOL (OFFICIAL)
Message-ID: <9403132313.AA23713@prism.poly.edu>
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As promised, here's the official transcript of the Barlow v. Denning debate
on AOL:

<< Here's the official transcript of the Barlow v Denning debate.  My
comments are within the angle braces, as is this one.  No text was 
changed, only comments and notes were inserted. >>


TIME Online Odeon, March 10, 1994

Tonight's TIME Online Odeon is a debate about the controversial "Clipper
Chip" policy of the U.S. government.  Our guests are John Barlow (Barlow1)
and Dorothy Denning (DDenning), who were both interviewed for TIME's
Clipper story in the March 14, 1994, issue of the magazine.  Philip
Elmer-DeWitt (PhilipED), TIME senior writer and author of the story,
moderates the debate, and Robert Pondiscio (RPTime) of 
TIME is the host.

Editor's note:  I have edited this transcript slightly by moving small
pieces of text around to avoid confusion related to overlapping
responses.  (Tom Mandel)

OnlineHost : Good evening and welcome to the Time Online Odeon!  
                   Tonight we look from both sides at the Clipper Chip, a
                   semiconductor device that the National Security Agency 
                   developed and wants installed in every telephone, 
                   computer modem and fax machine. 

                   In his article in the current issue of TIME, Philip
                   Elmer-DeWitt writes:  "The chip combines a powerful  
                   encryption algorithm with a ''back door'' -- the 
                   cryptographic equivalent of the master key that opens 
                   schoolchildren's padlocks when they forget their 
                   combinations. A ''secure'' phone equipped with the chip 
                   could, with proper authorization, be cracked by the 
                   government.

                   "Law-enforcement agencies say they need this capability to
                   keep tabs on drug runners, terrorists and spies. Critics 
                   denounce the Clipper -- and a bill before Congress that
                   would require phone companies to make it easy to tap 
                   the new digital phones -- as Big Brotherly tools that will
                   strip citizens of whatever privacy they still have in the 
                   computer age. 

                   "Lined up on one side are the three-letter cloak-and-
                   dagger agencies -- the NSA, the CIA and the FBI -- and key
                   policymakers in the Clinton Administration (who are 
                   taking a surprisingly hard line on the encryption issue). 
                   Opposing them is an equally unlikely coalition of computer
                   firms, civil libertarians, conservative columnists and a 
                   strange breed of cryptoanarchists who call themselves 
                   the cypherpunks." 

RPTime:   Lined up on our stage tonight are John Perry Barlow, Dr. 
                Dorothy Denning and Philip Elmer-DeWitt.  Barlow is 
                co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which 
                promotes freedom in digital media.  A recognized 
                commentator on computer security, he is arguing against 
                the Clipper Chip.

                Dr. Denning is the chairperson of the Computer Science 
                Department at Georgetown University. A leading expert 
                on cryptography and data security, she favors the 
                adoption of the  Clipper Chip.

                Philip Elmer-DeWitt, TIME's technology editor will lead 
                the questioning of our guests.

                Audience questions may be sent up using the Interact
                with Host function....Phil?

PhilipED:   Dr. Denning, could you *briefly* make the case for why 
                we need the key escrow encryption system?

DDenning: The government needs a new encryption standard to 
                replace DES.  They came up with a very strong 
                algorithm called SKIPJACK.  In making that available, 
                they didn't want to do it in a way that could ultimately 
                prove harmful to society.  So they came up with the 
                idea of key escrow so that if SKIPJACK were used 
                to conceal criminal activity, they would be able to get 
                access to the communications.

PhilipED:  Thanks. Mr. Barlow, could you briefly make the case
                *against* Clipper?

Barlow1:   We'll see if I can be brief...We oppose Clipper in 
                large part because of the traffic analysis which it 
                makes possible.  We believe that it is in the 
                functional nature of the chip as designed to greatly 
                enhance the ability of government to observe who 
                we are calling, when, and from where, all fairly 
                automatically and centrally.  We also oppose Clipper 
                because of the many way in which we believe the 
                escrow system could be compromised, by people 
                and institutions both inside and outside of government.

PhilipED:   Dr. Denning, what about John's contention that 
                Clipper makes it easier to detect calling patterns?

DDenning: I don't buy this.  First off, for law enforcement to
                access any communications, they need a court 
                order.  Even if the communications are encrypted.  
                Second, with a court order, they can get access 
                to call setup information and find out what other 
                lines the subject of the investigation is talking to.
                This is of much more use than anything in the 
                encrypted stream. 

PhilipED:  John, is Dorothy right that you need a court order
                for call set up info?

Barlow1:   Dorothy, the government asked for and received over
               100,000 calling records last year without a court
               order.  I see nothing in the Clipper documents which
               indicates that they would require a court order to get 
               this kind of information, which each chip would make 
               readily available to the entire network. Furthermore, 
               my faith in court orders has been eroded by 30 years
               of government wiretap abuse.

DDenning: You need a court order to do implement pen registers
                and dialed number recorders in order to find out who
                is talking to whom.

Barlow1:   But that's only with the present system where putting
               a pen register on a line requires physical entrance to a 
               company site.

PhilipED:  Aren't we talking about three different hurdles here, one 
               for a wiretap, one for a pen register (to track calling 
               patterns in real time) and one for phone records?

Barlow1:   There are three different sources of information, as
                you say. But there are not three "hurdles."

RPTime:   Let's take a question from the audience...

Question:  How would you guarantee that this facility will never be 
                misused?  If you can't make that guarantee, why 
                should a democratic society, with a prohibition 
                against prior restraint, consent to this?

RPTime:   John Barlow?

Barlow1:   That sounds like a question for Dorothy. I don't think 
                we should, obviously.

RPTime:   Dr. Denning?

DDenning: First of all, there has been no evidence of widespread 
                abuse of wiretaps since passage of the 1968 and 1978 
                wiretap statutes.  Second, there are a lot of security 
                mechanisms going into it to protect against abuse.
                Third, it will provide much greater protection against 
                illegal wiretaps than we have now, since almost all 
                phone conversations are in the clear.  It will make 
                virtually all illegal wiretaps impossible.  Fourth,
                if for some reason it doesn't provide adequate 
                protection, we can destroy the key databases and 
                everyone will have absolute privacy against government
                wiretaps.  I don't think our society will tolerate that 
                kind of abuse.  

PhilipED:  John, isn't Dorothy right that you're better off with 
                compromised encryption than none?

Barlow1:   Gee, where to begin...First of all, there was plenty 
                of abuse after 1968.  Remember Watergate, Dorothy?
                Second, I believe that Clipper in the Net will 
                dramatically *enhance* certain powers of surveillance 
                over current technical abilities. One of the reasons that
                wiretap hasn't been more abused is the bureaucratic 
                overhead of current practices. Make it so that it 
                doesn't require 50 agents to conduct a wire tap and 
                you'll see a lot more of it.  And Watergate included 
                quite a number of wiretap violations. Indeed,  the 
                burglers were caught trying to install one.

DDenning: I was talking specifically about wiretap abuses.  And
                there hasn't been any evidence since the 1978 law.

Barlow1: As to the assertion that we can always back up and 
               destroy the databases if we don't like it, I can't imagine 
               that someone as bright as yourself would believe that 
               this is possible. Technology and power ratchet into 
               positions which almost never retract without a complete 
               change in the system of authority 

RPTime:   Care to respond Dr. Denning?

DDenning: Clipper would prevent the Watergate burglars from getting 
                anywhere since they wouldn't have a court order.  
                Clipper will not make wiretaps cheaper or easier.  Wiretaps
                are becoming more difficult.  And there will always be 
                more agents involved because they have to follow 
                exacting procedures, including minimization (throw out
                all conversations that are not specific to the crime at
                hand).

Barlow1:   Dorothy, they were from the *Government* remember? I can't 
                imagine that Nixon wouldn't have been able to find a 
                sympathetic ear from somebody at NIST and somebody else 
                at Treasury.  Further, you're not talking about the truly 
                insidious element of this, which is dramatically improved 
                traffic analysis. Content is less important than context, 
                and most agents will support this.

RPTime:   Another question from the audience.  JCMaille asks...

Question:  Does the government have a constitutional right of access 
                to my personal communications?

RPTime:    Dr. Denning, why don't you go first?

DDenning: The Supreme Court ruled that wiretaps with a court 
                order are constitutional.  At one time, communications 
                were not even protected under the 4th Amendment.  
                The government could wiretap without a court order!  
                Now a court order is required.

PhilipED:  To put the question another way, do citizens have a right 
                to use powerful encryption?

DDenning: Right now there are no laws preventing the use of any
                encryption.  Clipper is voluntary.  You can still use
                something else.

<< Notice that she said "Right now" as if she is aware of a possible
   bit of legislation that would make all other encryption methods
   illegal!!!>>

RPTime:   We have to apologize.  John Barlow has temporarily lost 
                his connection...

PhilipED:  Dr. Denning, in your opinion would a law outlawing 
                powerful encryption be unconstitutional?

DDenning: I don't think so.  But that doesn't mean it will happen.
<< NOTE: ^^^^^^ ******* ^^^^^>>

RPTime:   John Barlow is back with us.  Sorry for the interruption! 

PhilipED:  Barlow, Denning just said she didn't think a law banning 
                powerful encryption would be unconstitutional.  What 
                do you say?

Barlow1:   Actually, I believe that our current export embargoes are 
               a violation of the 1st Amendment which specify speech 
               without regard to the manner of speech. If we could 
               restrict manner of speech, it would be constitutional 
               to require that everyone speak English. Which of 
               course it isn't.

PhilipED : John, can you make the case why ordinary law-abiding 
                citizens need powerful encryption?

Barlow1:   Because it is in the nature of digitally networked 
                communications to be quite visible. Everytime
                we make any sort of transaction in a digital
                environment, we smear our fingerprints all over
                Cyberspace.  If we are to have any privacy in the 
                future, we will need virtual "walls" made of cryptography.

RPTime:   Another audience question...

Question:  Isn't this like the gun argument? If guns are outlawed 
                only criminals will have guns?  Well, if Clipper is 
                standardized, won't criminals be the ones NOT 
                using it?

RPTime:   Dr. Denning?

DDenning: If Clipper becomes the de facto standard, then it will 
                be the chief method of encryption.  That would be
                what you'd get at Radio Shack.  What criminals
                use will depend on what is readily available and what
                their cohorts are using.  Both parties of a 
                conversation have to use the same thing.  Criminals 
                also talk to a lot of people outside their immediate 
                circle - e.g., to buy goods and services.  Also, 
                they can be quite stupid at times.  But the main 
                thing is that criminals will not be able to take 
                advantage of the SKIPJACK algorithm as a way 
                of concealing their  conversations.  This is the 
                whole point.  It is not to catch criminals.  It is
                to allow people access to a really high quality
                algorithm in a way that someone cannot use 
                it to conceal criminal activity.

<< More like it's to have people think they have a really high quality
encryption device while they are spied upon by Uncle Sam's boys.>>

Barlow1:   The gun analogy is excellent up to a point. I can't
                for the life of me imagine why we would think that
                even a stupid criminal would use Clipper if 
                something else were available. And when I talk
                to people in the administration their big hobgoblin
                is the "nuclear-armed" terrorist. Any fanatic 
                smart enough to assemble and detonate a nuclear
                device is going to be smart enough to download
                PGP from a bulletin board somewhere.
 
                Also, I'd like to point out that the gun analogy
                doesn't go the whole distance. Crypto is by its
                nature a purely *defensive* technology. You can't
                shoot people with it.

PhilipED:  Speaking of PGP, Dr. Denning, is that encryption
                system secure, in your opinion?

DDenning: I don't know of anyone who's been able to break the
                IDEA algorithm that it uses.

<< Notice that she sidesteps Barlow's point about gun control and
only answers about IDEA. >>

RPTime:   Back to the audience for a question from Steve HW..

Question:  This is for Dr. Denning.  What is the evidence of 
                harm if the Clipper proposal is not adopted?

DDenning: The harm would be to the government.  They would
                not be able to use it and would have to resort 
                to something less secure.  Also, Clipper is part 
                of a larger project to make hardware available 
                for encryption and digital signatures.  This
                will be used, for example, in the Defense Message
                System.  The goverment needs a new standard.
                I personally believe that making really powerful
                encryption like SKIPJACK available without 
                key escrow could be harmful to society.  Wiretaps 
                have been essential for preventing and solving 
                many serious crimes and terrorist activities.

<< If Clipper is to be used for digital signatures, what's to stop
a cop who did a wire tap from pretending to be the parties he just
spied on?  There would be no harm to government as there are other
encryption methods out there just as strong as skipjack if not
more so.   The new standard could simply be RSA, IDEA, etc...>>

Barlow1:   Why on earth would the government have to use 
                 something else if they failed to get the rest of
                 rest of us to buy into this folly?  Hey, they are 
                 already using SKIPJACK. It's a government 
                 algorithm and has been in use for a: long time.
                 There are plenty other algorithms which we
                 can use which  are truly protected... unless of 
                 course, this is only the first step in a process
                 which will outlaw other forms of crypto. And I
                 believe that it must be. Makes absolutely no sense
                 otherwise. 

<< Bingo! >>
 
DDenning : CPSR and others are asking the government to drop
                  Clipper.

Barlow1:    EFF is not asking the Government to drop Clipper,
                   though we would vastly prefer they did. We're
                   merely asking that no steps be taken to require it
                   either by law or practice...as, for example, would
                   be the case if you had to use a Clipper chip to file
                   your tax return.

PhilipED :     Dr. Denning, do you think this is the "first step in
                   a process to outlaw crypto"?

DDenning:   No I do not.  The government has not been using
                   SKIPJACK to my knowledge.  The Clipper initiative 
                   represents the first time that the government has
                   put one of their really good algorithms out there in 
                   the unclassified arena.  They are trying to do this
                   in a way that won't backfire against the public.
                   Other NSA developed algorithms are not available 
                   for purchase by the public.

<< Yeah, right sure they won't try to outlaw other encryption methods.  
If the NSA has other algorithms which are not for public use, let the
Government use some of those instead!>>

Barlow1:     I appreciate their willingness to make some of that
                   crypto research available to a public which has paid
                   so much for it, but I'm afraid that I would never 
                   trust an algorithm which was given to me by any
                   government.  And I certainly don't trust a classified 
                   algorithm like Skipjack, even without a back door 
                   which everyone can see. I think I'll stick to systems
                   which have been properly vetted to be clear of 
                   such compromises, like RSA. I hope others will do 
                   likewise and that RSA will become the standard 
                   which Clipper shouldn't be.

RPTime:      Time for one more question from our audience...

Question:   To John Barlow:  Isn't society becoming increasingly
                   vulnerable to concerted criminal/terrorist disruption, 
                   requiring *stronger* law enforcement tools?

Barlow1:    Gee. I don't know. It's a scary world. However, I'm
                   willing to take my chances with the few terrorists
                   and drug lords there are out there rather than
                   trusting government with the kind of almost unlimited
                   surveillance power which Clipper and Digital 
                   Telephony would give them. It's a touch choice. But
                   when you look at the evil perpetrated by government
                   over this century in the name of stopping crime,
                   it far exceeds that done by other organized criminals.

<< Here, here!>>
 
PhilipED:     Dr. Denning, hasn't remote listening technology 
                  enhanced police abilities to eavesdrop to the point...
                  where the loss of a few wire taps won't mean much?

DDenning: No.  They need to get the cooperation of the service
                  providers to implement a wiretap.  The loss of some 
                 wiretaps could be costly indeed.  As an example,
                 wiretaps were used to help solve a case that involved
                 plans by a Chicago gang from shooting down a 
                 commercial airliner.  There have been 2 cases where
                 they helped save the lives of kids who were going to
                 be kidnaped for the making of a snuff murder film.
                 They helped solve a case where a man's house was 
                 going to be bombed.  I could go on.  If we take John's
                 arguments about law enforcement to their logical 
                 conclusion, we'd just get rid of law enforcement.  I 
                 think it's better to have it.  The people in law 
                 enforcement hate it as much as the rest of us when
                 some member of the community does something wrong.
                 And they correct it, design new procedures and laws
                 where necessary, and go on.

<< Notice she side-stepped the whole remote listening issue and instead
introduced the four horsemen of law enforcement (Terrorists, Drug Dealers,
Child Molesters, and Pornographers.) >> 

Barlow1:  Oh, please. I'm not proposing eliminating police. I'm
                 opposing giving them unlimited powers.  Also,these 
                 are the same cases cited over and over by everyone 
                 from you to Judge Freeh.  Surely, we aren't going to 
                 fundamentally change the balance of power in this 
                 country because of these two (undocumented, to my 
                 knowledge) stories.

DDenning: Clipper is not going to change the balance of power.
                  It does not give law enforcement any additional
                  authority to do wiretaps.  

<< Yeah, right....  Two DAT tapes could contain the whole of the
key-escrow databases.. what price would some desperate criminal
organization, government, or government agency pay to obtain them?>>

Barlow1:   Well, this is where we basically disagree, Dorothy.
                  If we could continue the same level of law
                  enforcement capacity we presently have, I'd have 
                  no objection. But I believe, for reasons I'm not sure 
                  we have the bandwidth to discuss here, that we 
                  are talking about dramatically enhancing their abilities. 
                  For one thing, we would greatly reduce the 
                  bureaucratic overhead involved in wiretap, which is 
                  what keeps it under 900 cases nationwide at the 
                  present.

RPTime:     And that will have to be the last word on the matter
                 for tonight...

DDenning: The overhead of a wiretap is more likely to increase,
                 not decrease.

PhilipED:   Not quite!

RPTime:    Maybe not!  ;-)

RPTime:   THAT will be the final word!

Barlow1:  Well, let's get together and talk, Dorothy. 

RPTime:   TIME thanks Dr. Dorothy Denning and John Perry
                Barlow for being with us tonight...along with 
                Philip Elmer-DeWitt.  Thank you all, and goodnight!

PhilipED:  Thank you both. This was very interesting. 

DDenning: Thank you for the opportunity to be here!

Copyright 1994.  Time Inc.  All rights reserved.







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