1994-04-10 - Re: Shot ‘Round the World

Header Data

From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
To: snyderra@dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu
Message Hash: 403eb7e9643b52dcbdc611048f96581205918318658b348e238e9b087e72fd45
Message ID: <199404100311.AA21001@access1.digex.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-04-10 03:12:11 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 9 Apr 94 20:12:11 PDT

Raw message

From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 9 Apr 94 20:12:11 PDT
To: snyderra@dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu
Subject: Re: Shot 'Round the World
Message-ID: <199404100311.AA21001@access1.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr Davis:
>You may authenicate the NSA manual via confirmation by the phone numbers
>listed in it.  Consider this the shot heard round the world in the
>Electronic Revolution.
 
Well, this certainly helped the "cause."  If I were a media person
recieving this mail, I'd get a good laugh, then hit delete.
 
I don't see anything nifty, wonderful, or unusual in the manual.  I've held
a Secret clearance doing work as a Defense contractor, and the requirements
aren't abnormal.  They're stricter, but given that the clearance level is
higher and it's in the intelligence community, it's not unusual.  I would
seriously doubt the manual is of much interest to the media.
 
If you want to help, mail the media about privacy, and what Clipper is
going to do to it.  This kind of mail just makes the online community look
like fanatical crackpots.
 
Bob
(I'm an EFF member as well.  What does that have to do with your message?)
 
--
Bob Snyder N2KGO                                     MIME, RIPEM mail accepted
snyderra@dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu                       finger for RIPEM public key
         When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

<-

I tend to side with Mr. Snyder here.  I would add that Mr. Davis has probably
attracted a good deal of attention to himself for little gain.

Distributing the manual anonymously would have made more sense, and in the
event that the manual becomes an issue of contention or a torch for a
witchhunt, Mr. Davis would be an interesting martyr in the quest to test
the security of remailers and anonymous distribution.

I fail to see how this is an important step for the cause.

The manual was already in active distribution, the media will probably be
the first to jump on the "electronic risks" bandwagon by noting how easy it
would have been for an individual to spread a much more damning document.

This brings up a curious point.

If the cause is thawarting intelligence agencies, the next Clipper will be
much less open, perhaps even black.  My take on the point of cyberpunks
was to make the technology available, organize the positive societal
impacts, and prevent the government regulation of information and technology.
How can the reckless distribution of (admittedly moderate) intelligence
information serve these goals?  As much of an anti-estlablishment movement
as cypherpunks might associate themselves with, since when has treason
been on the agenda?  (Obviously I don't label Mr. Davis a traitor, but
I'm not in authority in this matter.)

Even Mr. May, who I most respectfully place on the heavy side of anti-
estlablishment, has often noted that the goal is to allow society to
evolve into the technology that is available.

Freedom of information, and nil transaction cost in anonymous settings
is key in empowering the individual and securing individual rights.
Obviously the goal will conflict with modern intelligence agencies that
seek to attempt domestic monitoring, but I think everyone here needs
to address the role of such agencies in the grand scheme of things.

Is the cypherpunk position a lawless one, or one promoting the evolution
of law?

I will be the first to assert that the manual was basically non-damning,
I did in fact assert so some days ago.  But consider, what if it had indeed
been a revelation in the security methods and practices of the intelligence
agency?  That would be a significant compromise, and cost mass sums of money
in modified security efforts by the agency.  Not to mention the fact that
it stands to endanger lives.  Consider the recent attack on the CIA.

I doubt that even this would have prevented the wild distribution of the
manual however, prompting me to wonder about the place of responsibility
and restraint in the realm of freedom of information.

Who would be the bidders on BlackNet for such information?
No one who wanted to know simply for academic purposes I'll wager.

Issues like this seem to add to the Pro-Clipper arguements.
The current pathalogical obsession with anti-crime measures can only
be fueled with incidents like this and the MIT piracy case.
If anon.penet.fi was not really used in this case, we see how the media
will capitolize on these events to feed the headlines, and in this case
that means anti-crime positions.

Most media people will pass up the manual, just as someone suggested they
might.  What concerns me is the radical right reporter who asks,
"Just who is this guy and why does he have this manual?"

-uni- (Dark)






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