1994-04-27 - Re: clipper not end of world

Header Data

From: rarachel@prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian)
To: dday@houston.geoquest.slb.com (Dan Day)
Message Hash: f7e4be04371cbb65617fad4234f35ffeff9aca92da95c706228cc0f9c2518916
Message ID: <9404271631.AA00507@prism.poly.edu>
Reply To: <199404271604.LAA07155@mudd.se.houston.geoquest.slb.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-04-27 16:44:23 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 27 Apr 94 09:44:23 PDT

Raw message

From: rarachel@prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 94 09:44:23 PDT
To: dday@houston.geoquest.slb.com (Dan Day)
Subject: Re: clipper not end of world
In-Reply-To: <199404271604.LAA07155@mudd.se.houston.geoquest.slb.com>
Message-ID: <9404271631.AA00507@prism.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


About sending bad blocks...  if your receiving party can listen in on the
transmission, you could simply change the program for them to include another
checksum somewhere else in the middle of the block.  Say, packet a has a bad
checksum, then its a candidate for hidden info.. so you check your secret
checksum.  If it matches, you decode the compressed block.

Obviously, your transmitter should send the steggoed data twice due to
possible real errors which would eat your cyphermessage for lunch.  Of course
the repeats would have to look different than the originally sent stegoed
packets or else the warden might get suspicious if he decides to have a look
at the bad packets...





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