1994-07-28 - Re: Questions about Microsoft and Software Key Escrow

Header Data

From: Mike_Spreitzer.PARC@xerox.com
To: blancw@microsoft.com
Message Hash: 1c9df2dc46dc721224596af9f2cec0b544152e30cb3b209dcb3ac367bb0ded34
Message ID: <94Jul28.140605pdt.14505(10)@alpha.xerox.com>
Reply To: <9407281543.AA28814@netmail2.microsoft.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-07-28 21:06:49 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 28 Jul 94 14:06:49 PDT

Raw message

From: Mike_Spreitzer.PARC@xerox.com
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 94 14:06:49 PDT
To: blancw@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: Questions about Microsoft and Software Key Escrow
In-Reply-To: <9407281543.AA28814@netmail2.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <94Jul28.140605pdt.14505(10)@alpha.xerox.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't see what "key escrow" is good for besides enabling wiretaps.  Am I
missing something here?

In any public-key system, even one without "key escrow", I know (or could
easily discover if I wanted to) my own private key.  Yes, I may want to make
some kind of "backup" arrangements for my key, to cover forgetfulness, death,
or whatever.  But that doesn't require anything in the communication/storage
formats (e.g., no LEAF field).  The managment of my private key is independent
of communication/storage of encrypted material.

"Key escrow", on the other hand, is about building into the
communication/storage formats a requirement that I use only keys that are
"escrowed".  I don't see what this adds, other than a requirement that my
communication/storage be interceptable with the cooperation of my "escrow
agents".





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