1994-07-29 - No SKE in Daytona and other goodies

Header Data

From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: d73a5b43ecc597fa99dcc577d5e481596b3cacc5b9e3cdb27b70f00f92fcc151
Message ID: <9407291841.AA03054@ah.com>
Reply To: <199407291749.KAA26655@meefun.autodesk.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-07-29 19:13:49 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 29 Jul 94 12:13:49 PDT

Raw message

From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 94 12:13:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
In-Reply-To: <199407291749.KAA26655@meefun.autodesk.com>
Message-ID: <9407291841.AA03054@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   A technical question about the proposed SKE schemes: are they a
   proper superset of non-escrowed pgp/ripem type systems

I'm not sure what you mean by superset, but I suspect that however you
interpret it, the answer is no.

   As a previous
   poster mentioned, users could select null or locally controlled key
   escrow agents, and effectively have a non-escrowed system. 

The system I've seen (Whit's recollection of Steve Walker's) did not
allow a cooperating party to interoperate with a non-cooperating
party.  In other words, both correspondents must comply with gov't key
surrender, or neither.

Matt or Whit can comment better, since they've seen it first hand.

Eric





Thread