1994-07-29 - Re: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies

Header Data

From: Andrew Purshottam <andy@autodesk.com>
To: tcmay@localhost.netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Message Hash: dba0d0ea60099dec7f54657bd9e74bc12e43bc4a0bf7f1de92eb3630a4468a74
Message ID: <199407291749.KAA26655@meefun.autodesk.com>
Reply To: <199407290812.BAA11924@netcom2.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-07-29 17:50:10 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 29 Jul 94 10:50:10 PDT

Raw message

From: Andrew Purshottam <andy@autodesk.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 94 10:50:10 PDT
To: tcmay@localhost.netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
In-Reply-To: <199407290812.BAA11924@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199407291749.KAA26655@meefun.autodesk.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A technical question about the proposed SKE schemes: are they a proper superset
of non-escrowed pgp/ripem type systems (pk for key exchange/auth, private
session keys for privacy)? As a previous poster mentioned, users
could select null or locally controlled key escrow agents, and effectively
have a non-escrowed system. This would be possible only if the 
users one wished to communicate with did co-operate, and did somehow
exchange public keys with you in a non-escrowed fashion, right? 
Is this then a strong argument for the web-of-trust model?

If I am tottaly out in left field here, feel free to berate me
in private mail, and I'll post no further on this.

Andy






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