1994-08-30 - Re: Nuclear Weapons Material

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From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
To: ianf@simple.sydney.sgi.com
Message Hash: 4faedd63fa28fd242cdce9ffbbad6c832de87e6bc5cf3e89654e908e0969a795
Message ID: <9408300124.AA16228@io.lrcs.loral.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-08-30 01:25:59 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 29 Aug 94 18:25:59 PDT

Raw message

From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 94 18:25:59 PDT
To: ianf@simple.sydney.sgi.com
Subject: Re: Nuclear Weapons Material
Message-ID: <9408300124.AA16228@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I heard a rumor (from several independent sources) which indicated that the
>firing sequences are essentially encrypted detonator timings that are passed
>through the PAL, which decrypts it but makes no value judgement about the
>timings themselves. If the timings are wrong, you get a messy squib explosion
>which will make a mess for about 100m around the detonation site, and which
>will totally destroy the weapon beyond any hope of recovery.


One would expect that there should be something in the permissive action
link that prevents a radioactive mess as well, but I have heard these
rumors too.

I always wondered if you could do dial a yield this way.  What you are
inferring is a bunch of cables of different length (delay) or the
equivalent between the firing circuit and the detonators.  The input
delay information would specify which delayed version of the detonate
signal goes down which path.


I get the impression that PAL is a little more complex than that, one
of the reputed goals is to prevent a weapon from being easily modified
to go around safeguards.  Playing with just delays can be overcome 
by characterizing delays in a dismantled weapon.






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