1994-09-12 - Re: Introduction- Telephone

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From: “Ron Bardarson” <Ron_Bardarson@smtp.esl.com>
To: shamrock@netcom.com
Message Hash: 0b0af3f51a509f51c53cfd94d25cc7215cc7784f86df2c1d14817ed230f4e5fc
Message ID: <n1432764227.32914@smtp.esl.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-09-12 15:25:32 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 12 Sep 94 08:25:32 PDT

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From: "Ron Bardarson" <Ron_Bardarson@smtp.esl.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 94 08:25:32 PDT
To: shamrock@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Introduction- Telephone
Message-ID: <n1432764227.32914@smtp.esl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        Reply to:   RE>>Introduction: Telephone traffic analysis

>> I stumbled upon this great explanation of telephone traffic analysis and
>> thought I'd share it with the list:

>It is to evade this sort of traffic analysis that complex routing, batching
>and clustering of anon remailer traffic is being evolved.

As long as 'someone else' controls the medium thru which the messages pass,
traffic analysis will be possible.  It may be a large problem, but it will
still be doable with sufficient motivation.  When you have an untappable wire
between the sender and recipient, then traffic analysis is impossible (and
crypto unnecessary).  In order to get to the remailer chain you mention, I
(for instance) can ONLY pass thru a couple a machines, which if properly
monitored, reveal the traffic flow despite the remailers.  You can still beat
traffic analysis (and you still need crypto), but not in this medium.






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