1994-12-27 - Re: Are 2048-bit pgp keys really secure ?

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From: eric@remailer.net (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: a2d616af9f98a47db8ed8aadcc47a2d1de847e3c234ff872faa1023ad70fec5f
Message ID: <199412272106.NAA01249@largo.remailer.net>
Reply To: <9412271941.AA19596@elysion.iaks.ira.uka.de>
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-27 20:06:18 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Dec 94 12:06:18 PST

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From: eric@remailer.net (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 94 12:06:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Are 2048-bit pgp keys really secure ?
In-Reply-To: <9412271941.AA19596@elysion.iaks.ira.uka.de>
Message-ID: <199412272106.NAA01249@largo.remailer.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: danisch@ira.uka.de (Hadmut Danisch)

   Usually a candidate number is send through a probabilistic prime test
   which says either "No, not a prime" or "a prime with a probability of
   at least 50% ". Usually this test is repeated 10 or 20 times, so after
   passing this iteration the probability of having a prime number is at
   least 1:2^10 or 1:2^20 . 

The probability of a composite passing one trial is extremely small,
much smaller than 50%.  _And_ the trials with different moduli are
_not_ independent, so you just can't multiply the probabilities
together.  Rather, you have to calculate a chain of conditional
probabilities.

There was a paper in the last seven or eight years on this.  I believe
Pomerance was one of the authors.  Ask on sci.crypt for details.

   I am also not
   convinced yet of the Fermat test. Why not use a Rabin-Miller-Test ?

Rabin-Miller would be better.  It would be instructive to examine the
conditional probability that a composite number which fails
Rabin-Miller passes Fermat.  I understand it's vanishingly small.

Eric





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