1995-01-27 - Re: CERT statement

Header Data

From: Marc Horowitz <marc@cam.ov.com>
To: perry@imsi.com
Message Hash: c1478c1b51a2a3951d12e43d243eab7f58e52e70eeb02bc9c766cb35613c874b
Message ID: <9501270011.AA07672@dun-dun-noodles.cam.ov.com>
Reply To: <9501270006.AA17831@snark.imsi.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-01-27 00:09:05 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 26 Jan 95 16:09:05 PST

Raw message

From: Marc Horowitz <marc@cam.ov.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 95 16:09:05 PST
To: perry@imsi.com
Subject: Re: CERT statement
In-Reply-To: <9501270006.AA17831@snark.imsi.com>
Message-ID: <9501270011.AA07672@dun-dun-noodles.cam.ov.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Kerberos per se isn't sufficient to defend against session hijacking
>> attacks, you know. The situation in question is really insidious and
>> requires packet-by-packet cryptographic authentication.

No, but kerberos or something like it is necessary.  And I think I can
safely say that anything which really defends against TCP sequence
spoofing or hijacking attacks will be more invasive and require more
effort than kerberos, not less.

		Marc





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