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1995-01-31 - Re: ESP Unix encrypted session protocol software

Header Data

From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
To: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@imsi.com>
Message Hash: d3ce194c9f81ed14e0b869fdd7834e8c4118acf44109fda9e52d86dfef9dc485
Message ID: <Pine.NEB.3.91.950131094454.21652n-100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Reply To: <9501302104.AA24274@snark.imsi.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-01-31 07:56:13 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 30 Jan 95 23:56:13 PST

Raw message

From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 95 23:56:13 PST
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@imsi.com>
Subject: Re: ESP Unix encrypted session protocol software
In-Reply-To: <9501302104.AA24274@snark.imsi.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.NEB.3.91.950131094454.21652n-100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Right - using DH exchange is probably appropriate in situations where
> > there is no pre-established credentials for the party on the other
> > machine.
> 
> D-H also provides perfect forward secrecy, which is a reason to use it
> even if there is already an established set of credentials.

How about public-key signing the D-H exchange?  Public key to eliminate[*]
the man-in-the-middle attack, and D-H for forward secrecy.

* Almost eliminate.  A sufficiently powerful man in the middle could 
  conceivably subvert the public keys.

--apb (Alan Barrett)

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