1995-07-17 - Re: bi-directional dining cryptographers

Header Data

From: Phil Fraering <pgf@tyrell.net>
To: futplex@pseudonym.com
Message Hash: d52871e3bcccb7794c28a1d58d7926f4e4e2f3d0835c3e74214e7ca7787a7bd5
Message ID: <199507171724.AA15346@tyrell.net>
Reply To: <9507171256.AA20139@cs.umass.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1995-07-17 17:29:23 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 17 Jul 95 10:29:23 PDT

Raw message

From: Phil Fraering        <pgf@tyrell.net>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 95 10:29:23 PDT
To: futplex@pseudonym.com
Subject: Re: bi-directional dining cryptographers
In-Reply-To: <9507171256.AA20139@cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <199507171724.AA15346@tyrell.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm rereading my mail at once; I've forgotten if I told you this
already.

Anyway, I just presupposed the same protocol outlined by Chaum in
his paper. It's disruptable, but so's any DC-net to begin with.

DC-nets presuppose a fair amount of co-operation between their
participants.

I'd also like to point out that this system indicates that during
an attack/disruption on a traditional dc-net, the disruptor can 
tell what the original person was trying to send, even though noone
else can.

And then perhaps XOR the data with something offensive, and if the
original sender tries to re-send, broadcast the result of the XOR,
resulting in a total net output of the offensive material.

I'm sure someone's going to try that sooner or later.

Phil





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