1995-09-13 - Re: Can GAK be made “not interoperable” with PGP?

Header Data

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Message Hash: 91c10f931a0a06c2e2ad0fdb4a607be00c26d24839a440f119fe1fd31b6def48
Message ID: <199509131926.PAA14444@panix.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-13 19:26:55 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Sep 95 12:26:55 PDT

Raw message

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 95 12:26:55 PDT
To: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Can GAK be made "not interoperable" with PGP?
Message-ID: <199509131926.PAA14444@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:26 AM 9/13/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:

>But is this even possible, to make a GAK system "not interoperable" with,
>say, PGP?
>
>Unless the GAK system has some sort of entropy analyzer, and can recognize
>high-entropy sources which it presumes to be encrypted data (*), one can of
>course PGP-encrypt a text file and then GAK the resulting file.

I took it to mean that they were saying that an approved program on one end
of a communication exchange could not exchange encrypted messages or
established an encrypted session of some kind with an un approved program on
the other end.  Not trying to outlaw superencryption (PGP on both ends using
a GAKed channel) but GAK on one end working with an unapproved system on the
other end.  A ringer GAK-work-alike that would defeat the intent of GAK.

I don't know if the government can prevent that with a software-only system
or indeed if half a secure system can be made completely secure.

DCF

"Markets and open systems beat governments and closed systems."






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