1995-10-19 - Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal

Header Data

From: Thomas Grant Edwards <tedwards@Glue.umd.edu>
To: kelso <kelso@netcom.com>
Message Hash: 0d11f04692ecd3f1a493e80e6dc16318ae5fd9ffb867f0c09e4d2f55d211c8fe
Message ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951019125552.25823A-100000@celsius.isr.umd.edu>
Reply To: <199510182035.NAA28382@netcom22.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-19 17:00:06 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 19 Oct 95 10:00:06 PDT

Raw message

From: Thomas Grant Edwards <tedwards@Glue.umd.edu>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 95 10:00:06 PDT
To: kelso <kelso@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
In-Reply-To: <199510182035.NAA28382@netcom22.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951019125552.25823A-100000@celsius.isr.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 18 Oct 1995, kelso wrote:

> One method to take the heat off of the last remailer
> in a chain would be to call on our friend the "one
> time pad".  A message is split into two equal parts
> that only make sense when the two parts are 'xor'ed
> together. 

Hmmm...this leads to the "unobnoxious anonymous remailer" concept.  I am 
under the impression that most cases of people getting upset about anon 
remailers is when they get threatening email from them.  

One could require that all email going through a remailer must be 
encrypted (perhaps with a universally known key).  That way when Joe 
clueless users gets encrypted mail he doesn't expect, he probably is too 
clueless to go find the key and decrypt it...

This would require the remailer to examine entropy of messages passing 
through.  Anything not random enough gets tossed.

-Thomas






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