1995-11-01 - Re: Perfect Forward Secrecy - is it worth it?

Header Data

From: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Message Hash: f63ad08e7b776bd5f19d1f8aa3e36b0fab61d6e421d21e44a339fe5e0a0c4473
Message ID: <199511011619.LAA01986@jekyll.piermont.com>
Reply To: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951031141506.1151H-100000@chivalry>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-01 17:06:05 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 01:06:05 +0800

Raw message

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 01:06:05 +0800
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Subject: Re: Perfect Forward Secrecy - is it worth it?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951031141506.1151H-100000@chivalry>
Message-ID: <199511011619.LAA01986@jekyll.piermont.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Simon Spero writes:
> Quick survey; how important is perfect forward secrecy to you?

Very. It makes one's life far easier. It makes protecting historical
traffic easy. Its a wonderful feature for a cryptosystem.

> In general, schemes offering PFS require a extra PK-op, and an extra 
> round-trip when compared to  non-PFS schemes. This cost is incurred once 
> per "session", but can add on the order of seconds to startup times. 

Well, things aren't that bad if you use eliptic curve variants on D-H,
or if you are very careful. See Phil Karn's work on this for Photuris...

Perry





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