1995-12-11 - Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack

Header Data

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
To: tomw@netscape.com>
Message Hash: 23eb2d08966fa13bf208889a25dfe8799534f824b58971ff2f024973df420518
Message ID: <0kn1kjCMc50e02ivZP@nsb.fv.com>
Reply To: <199512110845.JAA25564@utopia.hacktic.nl>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-11 21:10:34 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 05:10:34 +0800

Raw message

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 05:10:34 +0800
To: tomw@netscape.com>
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
In-Reply-To: <199512110845.JAA25564@utopia.hacktic.nl>
Message-ID: <0kn1kjCMc50e02ivZP@nsb.fv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, don't go for constant time, that's too hard to get perfect.  Add a
*random* delay.  This particular crypto-flaw is pretty easy to fix. 
(See, I'm not *always* arguing the downside of cryptography!)

It is worth noting, however, the extent to which "secure" cryptographic
protocols keep needing to get fixed one last time....  -- Nathaniel
--------
Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@fv.com>       | (Tense Hot Alien In Barn)
Chief Scientist, First Virtual Holdings | VIRTUAL YELLOW RIBBON:
FAQ & PGP key: nsb+faq@nsb.fv.com       | http://www.netresponse.com/zldf





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