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1995-12-13 - Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack

Header Data

From: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Message Hash: 5faa6098a7c93271ea5e89343308ea2eb9b2c41ccad84c37af1bc2364aacc139
Message ID: <199512131500.KAA01853@jekyll.piermont.com>
Reply To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951212231006.5039C-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-13 15:52:08 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 23:52:08 +0800

Raw message

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 23:52:08 +0800
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951212231006.5039C-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Message-ID: <199512131500.KAA01853@jekyll.piermont.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Simon Spero writes:
> Perry - I don't think NTP goes down to the sort of resolution that 
> appeared to be where the signal is here, and for quantisation reasons, I 
> don't think it can work over a public routed internetwork.

The question isn't whether you can really get the timing down as far
as you want, but whether you can use statistics to cut down your
search space sufficiently to make things interesting. I can't say, but
I'm no longer prepared to trust the stuff, being fairly conservative
in what I trust.

Perry

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