1995-12-29 - practical annoyances from multi-level security?

Header Data

From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 8ce788bc09cc2df941a6ee52ecb7419740f46993796afb57bc049d1718848141
Message ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951228220718.12483A-100000@chivalry>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-29 14:07:49 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 29 Dec 1995 22:07:49 +0800

Raw message

From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 1995 22:07:49 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: practical annoyances from multi-level security?
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951228220718.12483A-100000@chivalry>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anybody have any pet peeves and gripes about using 
systems with a compartmentalised security model- things that took ages to 
do even though they didn't really impact security, features that just got 
in the way or were too complicated to really use, etc?

I'm currently working on a problem that seems to have some analogies to 
the compartmentalised problem, running code with various levels of trust 
were deliberate read-up and accidental write-down could be a breach. 
I've  personally never used a system of this sort, but I've heard from 
friends in the RAF doing COM/SEC (more COM than SEC) that MLS can be a 
real pain at times. [for the truly paranoid, the RAF operates a network 
of communication satellites called Skynet :-)]

Simon
p.s. 
  still no luck on the Hackers soundtrack - I did recognise a few prodigy 
tracks though

(defun modexpt (x y n)  "computes (x^y) mod n"
  (cond ((= y 0) 1) 
	((= y 1) (mod x n))
	((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n))
	(t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))






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