1995-12-13 - Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack

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From: Armadillo Remailer <remailer@armadillo.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9b72d4e95cb0f89ebf969936245a20604151a8c7e66d4b39a062e59107468996
Message ID: <199512131315.HAA01726@monad.armadillo.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-13 14:37:51 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 22:37:51 +0800

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From: Armadillo Remailer <remailer@armadillo.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 22:37:51 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
Message-ID: <199512131315.HAA01726@monad.armadillo.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu> writes:

>My gut & scribble-on-the-back-of-a-napkin feeling about this class of
>attack is that it could be a problem for smartcards (almost certainly)

Is it a problem to create smartcards that do their calculations in
fixed time? I'd guess it should be easier than on multi-purpose
hardware.

Does the attack work for existing smartcards?





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