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1995-12-01 - Re: ecash lottery (Was: ecash casino)

Header Data

From: Scott Brickner <sjb@universe.digex.net>
To: iang@cs.berkeley.edu
Message Hash: e3acfa5c41251ccd386e624f2034bd50f52f3e5a6d8e315bf9ea5145784b034c
Message ID: <199512012201.RAA25506@universe.digex.net>
Reply To: <49j0sq$a69@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-01 23:14:24 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 07:14:24 +0800

Raw message

From: Scott Brickner <sjb@universe.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 07:14:24 +0800
To: iang@cs.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: ecash lottery (Was: ecash casino)
In-Reply-To: <49j0sq$a69@calum.csclub.uwaterloo.ca>
Message-ID: <199512012201.RAA25506@universe.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ian Goldberg writes:
>People pay by sending:
>{
>A payment made out to "@" (the ecash wildcard)
>Their choice of lottery ticket number
>A PGP Public key
>}
>encrypted with the lottery's public key, to the remailer address.

You still have the problem that the lottery agency gets to hold the
money until after the drawing.  It's reasonable to expect that they'll
eventually take advantage of their anonymity to just skip the drawing
and abscond with the bucks.  There's some incentive for them to *not*
do this on the first few drawings, but only so they can get a good
enough reputation so when they *do* skip, they'll get a lot more
money.

The problem with this whole scheme is that there has to be some
*non-*anonymous party to enforce the contract.

Thread