1995-12-11 - Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack

Header Data

From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
To: perry@piermont.com
Message Hash: e9b6ad999672f0d56ab144105f24bcb3baf936c5be6e43fdb4156d37aec40886
Message ID: <199512111906.OAA01139@crypto.com>
Reply To: <199512111815.NAA02202@jekyll.piermont.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-11 23:02:56 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 07:02:56 +0800

Raw message

From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 07:02:56 +0800
To: perry@piermont.com
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
In-Reply-To: <199512111815.NAA02202@jekyll.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <199512111906.OAA01139@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The trivial way to handle this is simply to check user time with the
>right system calls and make sure it always comes out the same with an
>apropriate number of sleeps.

Of course, this works against a remote adversary, but not against one
on the same machine who can look at actual CPU consumption (which doesn't
increase when the target is blocked).

-matt





Thread