1996-01-03 - Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis

Header Data

From: fc@all.net (Fred Cohen)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e39992097bef13505ca37e8345f15cc46313d3104cfdd74376a1cdd4b016990a
Message ID: <9601031202.AA18524@all.net>
Reply To: <199601030421.XAA29402@clark.net>
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-03 17:41:13 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 01:41:13 +0800

Raw message

From: fc@all.net (Fred Cohen)
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 01:41:13 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
In-Reply-To: <199601030421.XAA29402@clark.net>
Message-ID: <9601031202.AA18524@all.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic
analysis.  It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel
problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great
in the way of resources.  In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you
essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although
you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors).  This in turn means that
instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you
end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the
world does this) increasing the price of the resource.  So it costs a
lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth.

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