1996-01-10 - More on Belgian ‘key escrow law’

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From: lvhove@vnet3.vub.ac.be (Leo Van Hove)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: fb4bd34c0e564acc3b50fd297b190823c1501aef09a2c74f0563f47c81ed9d13
Message ID: <v01530504ad18686fc402@[134.184.16.171]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-10 15:22:43 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 10 Jan 1996 23:22:43 +0800

Raw message

From: lvhove@vnet3.vub.ac.be (Leo Van Hove)
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 1996 23:22:43 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More on Belgian 'key escrow law'
Message-ID: <v01530504ad18686fc402@[134.184.16.171]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I looked up the law mentioned in the newspaper article and it goes like
this (non french speaking cypherpunks, please see comments below <grin>):

----

"Loi du 21 décembre 1994 portant des dispositions sociales et diverses" -
published in the 'Moniteur Belge' (= the official journal in which all laws
are published), Vol. 164, Nr. 250, Friday 23 December 1994, p. 31878-31963.

(p. 31960-31961):
"
                                        Art. 202

        Il est inséré dans la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de
certaines entreprises publiques économiques, un article 70bis, rédigé comme
suit:

        <<Art. 70bis - Le Roi fixe, par arrêté délibéré en Conseil des
Ministres, les moyens techniques par lesquels Belgacom et les exploitants
des services non réservés qu'Il désigne doivent permettre, le cas échéant
éventuellement conjointement, le repérage, les écoutes, la prise de
connaissance et l'enregistrement des télécommunications privées dans les
conditions prévues par la loi du 30 juin 1994 relative à la protection de
la vie privée contre les écoutes, la prise de connaissance et
l'enregistrement de communications et de télécommunications privées.>>"

(p. 31961):
"
                                        Art. 203

        L'article 95, alinéa 1er, de la même loi est complété comme suit:

        <<5° l'appareil terminal rends inefficaces les moyens permettant,
dans les conditions prévues aux articles 88bis et 90ter à 90decies du Code
d'instruction criminelle, le repérage, les écoutes, la prise de
connaissance et l'enregistrement des télécommunications.>>"

----

Simplifying it all seems to boil down to this:
The 1994 Law ammends a 1991 Law; that is, it adds a couple of
articles/paragraphs.

Art. 202 stipulates that Belgacom (= Belgium's leading telephone company)
and other telecom companies have to cooperate with law enforcement when it
wants to tap telephone lines - no, sorry, make that telecom lines (!).
Note that tapping is only allowed under certain circumstances stipulated in
the so-called Privacy Law (see also my previous posting to this list).

Art. 203 is the most important as far as key escrow is concerned.  It
completes Art. 95 of the 1991 Law which stipulated 4 conditions in which
telecom equipment may be seized. These initial conditions are rather
harmless (equipment does no longer conform to the initial specifications,
it hinders public broadcasts, presents health risks for the users,...).
Art. 203 adds a 5th and stingy one: equipment that makes tapping impossible
may be disconnected from the network and seized ...  On the face of it -
I'm not a lawyer, so don't pin me down on this - this means no crypto (or
only with key escrow) ...

Ciao,

leo







_________________________________________________________________________
Leo Van Hove

Centre for Financial Economics
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University of Brussels)
Pleinlaan 2
B-1050 Brussels
Vox: +32 2 629.21.25
Fax: +32 2 629.22.82
e-mail: lvhove@vnet3.vub.ac.be

VUB's Web site: http://www.vub.ac.be
_________________________________________________________________________







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