1996-02-22 - Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)

Header Data

From: lull@acm.org (John Lull)
To: SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai@ecf.toronto.edu>
Message Hash: 7723b66cbab759663db2c9e22b172a0efca504dc37d5a46884f3c0ab677d0c32
Message ID: <312cab4d.13399722@smtp.ix.netcom.com>
Reply To: <96Feb22.110840edt.10494@cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1996-02-22 18:31:32 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 23 Feb 1996 02:31:32 +0800

Raw message

From: lull@acm.org (John Lull)
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 1996 02:31:32 +0800
To: SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai@ecf.toronto.edu>
Subject: Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)
In-Reply-To: <96Feb22.110840edt.10494@cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>
Message-ID: <312cab4d.13399722@smtp.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 22 Feb 1996 11:08:37 -0500, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N
<sinclai@ecf.toronto.edu> wrote:

> What they have gained is the knowledge that their random number source
> isn't broken.  If your RNG started spewing 0 bits by the thousand would
> you say "This stream is just as likely as any other stream that I can
> imagine so there is no problem", or "My RNG is broken".  Of course,
> in nice mathematical abstractions your RNG never breaks, but we live in
> a nasty world of thermal failiures and cold solder joints.

No, they really haven't.  Their initial post indicated that they are
throwing away some 50% of their generated sets of "random" data.  This
indicates either their random number generator is seriously broken, or
their analysis of the numbers produced is seriously broken.  Either
way, they have a significant problem which they are NOT addressing.


In any truly random data stream, you would expect a certain percentage
of blocks to have statistics outside whatever you decide is the
"typical" range.  If their generator is producing significantly more
or less than the expected number of "atypical" blocks, it is broken.
If is producing about the expected number of such blocks, it is likely
working as designed, and such blocks are still TRULY random.

In any case, throwing away some selected portion of its output is NOT
an appropriate cure for a broken random number generator.

The proper cure is fixing the generator.


As a separate issue, if your cryptosystem has a set of "weak keys" it
may make sense to screen your random numbers to prevent use of such
weak keys.  This, however, appears not to be what IPG is doing.





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