1996-02-18 - Re: Some thoughts on the Chinese Net

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From: lmccarth@cs.umass.edu
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Message Hash: d23e767fec315c8b6b5060abcce50b24f3c1ec326e5d148cf0859f3695150130
Message ID: <199602180435.XAA24397@thor.cs.umass.edu>
Reply To: <199602171820.NAA12476@pipe11.nyc.pipeline.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-02-18 05:07:30 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 18 Feb 1996 13:07:30 +0800

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From: lmccarth@cs.umass.edu
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 1996 13:07:30 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: Some thoughts on the Chinese Net
In-Reply-To: <199602171820.NAA12476@pipe11.nyc.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199602180435.XAA24397@thor.cs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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tallpaul writes: 
[re: hypothetical Chinese IP address-based filtering]
> Assuming this system is estabished, then we would want to modify our
> remailers to strip IP packet information as well as normal header, no? 

I'm not entirely sure what you mean. Present remailers don't save anything
except for (parts of) RFC 822 message bodies, and occasionally some SMTP
mail headers. Certainly no packet-level headers (like IP) are saved at all.

Presumably The Chinese Wall (and many other gateways, routers, etc.) would
simply drop any packets that managed to arrive without originating IP address
information. You could use something that emits packets with "incorrect" /
"forged" IP headers, but that crosses an ethical line that I consider rather
important not to cross. The IPsec WG has been working on interhost 
authentication that should render the point moot, anyway.

-Lewis	"You're always disappointed, nothing seems to keep you high -- drive 
	your bargains, push your papers, win your medals, fuck your strangers;
	don't it leave you on the empty side ?"  (Joni Mitchell, 1972)





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