1996-03-03 - Re: Duress

Header Data

From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 36184939279193c391d5db024665bb8259315e00f33c6fbf7f5f818baa992aff
Message ID: <LXc9JD13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Reply To: <960303121209.2020214e@hobbes.orl.mmc.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-03 21:26:58 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 05:26:58 +0800

Raw message

From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis)
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 05:26:58 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Duress
In-Reply-To: <960303121209.2020214e@hobbes.orl.mmc.com>
Message-ID: <LXc9JD13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT@hobbes.orl.mmc.com> writes:
> Those of you who follow FIREWALLS may recall that I premote the use of
> "minefields" on networks, machines that should never be accessed and will
> trigger an alarm/response on any access.
>
> Some years ago I wrote a spec for cryptographic securing of notebooks/
> E-Mail that included a "duress" capability: a "password" that, when
> entered would appear to be properly accepted but would report an error
> on retrieval. Optional was to be overwriting of any material whose access
> was attempted.

As a side remark, every burglar alarm connected to a phone that I've ever seen
has this feature: a code that one can type under duress that will both turn
off the alarm and call for help. I wonder how many users will remember this
code when under duress.

---

Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





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