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1996-03-02 - Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols

Header Data

From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
To: cp@proust.suba.com (Alex Strasheim)
Message Hash: 4a8649cbbca120e0f5bf988499b6423dcf06e242d069119222fd1cea8c57bc9d
Message ID: <199603010434.XAA10712@homeport.org>
Reply To: <199603010154.TAA05515@proust.suba.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-02 06:22:25 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 2 Mar 1996 14:22:25 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Mar 1996 14:22:25 +0800
To: cp@proust.suba.com (Alex Strasheim)
Subject: Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols
In-Reply-To: <199603010154.TAA05515@proust.suba.com>
Message-ID: <199603010434.XAA10712@homeport.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Alex Strasheim wrote:

| What's the advantage of using this url type system instead of "fully
| qualified" certificates, ie., attaching all the keys and signatures to the
| object?  Doesn't the give and take with the key servers more than wipe out
| the advantage of the smaller data object?
|
| Does the win come from solving the revocation problem?

	The win from a referenced system can come in two places.
First is standard places for keys, so I can ask a host for its telnetd's
key simply.  Second is that I may already have cached some of the
keys, and not need, for example, they key for toad.com/s/sendmail/

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume

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