1996-03-14 - Re: PGP reveals the key ID of the recipient of encrypted msg

Header Data

From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: a77f0d36f6d0a3cec05020954a62c362bf38b96b9df8871ece9c8ebfc3de160d
Message ID: <199603130447.UAA07749@ix3.ix.netcom.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-14 04:11:54 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 12:11:54 +0800

Raw message

From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 12:11:54 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP reveals the key ID of the recipient of encrypted msg
Message-ID: <199603130447.UAA07749@ix3.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>On Mon, 11 Mar 1996 savron@world-net.sct.fr wrote:
>> I began testing PGP  a few days ago ( I'm a PGP newbie ) and I found 
>> that it gives out the key ID of an encrypted message . From this you 
>> can get the  identification of the recipient of the message , if it's 
>> someone who has publicaly  distributed his  key (keyserver , homepage 
>> ...) . So even if you are unable to decode the message you  can find 
>> who is the recipient of a given message . I think this is a big 
>> privacy problem .

How much of a problem it is depends on the application you're using PGP for,
but yes, it's a concern.  There's a program called "stealth" by "Harry Hastur"
which lets you remove or hide this information, as well as hiding most of
the PGP headers.  (There are some aspects of PGP file structure that are
difficult to hide, at least without doing almost as much work as PGP
was already doing, and I don't know if it adjusts for the mathematical
properties of RSA-encrypted data which make it possible to identify the
public key over some number of messages.)

When the new PGP 3.0 comes out, there will be some support for
shorter keyIDs (which isn't perfect, but for instance a 4-bit keyID
would let you not try to decrypt 15/16ths of the messages,
while not really fingering you as the recipient.)

Also, if you have someone you frequently correspond with on some topic
(perhaps a mailing list) and want to be able to send them messages that
don't identify them, have them generate a public key they use just for 
that application.  You can send your request by anonymous remailer,
and they can send you a reply by anonymous remailer or post to
alt.anonymous.messages.  This still permits traffic analysis 
(nobody knows who keyid 0x12345678 is, but they know you sent him
ten messages in the last month.)

>> The problem is carried along when you encrypt a message for multiple  
>> recipients , you get the key IDs of all the recipients and same 
>> problem as above .  I think something like 'blind email copy' should 
>> be used , because the recipients don't have to know the identity of 
>> each other .
markm@voicenet.com  replied:
>You could just encrypt a message to different key ID's seperately, rather than
>in one pass of PGP.  The would have the effect of Bcc.

Yep.  That was the original PGP approach (i.e. "do nothing special"), and
multiple-recipients were added as an efficiency measure.
#--
#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281
# "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened
# to halt the growth of Internet use.  [...] Government control of news media 
# generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and
# social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who
# exceed the permissable."  - US government statement on China...






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