1996-03-13 - Re: Remailer passphrases

Header Data

From: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
To: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Message Hash: d4edf09785435f89f56a0dda048f2a109a1978ce1e45b1b1280647721fb078d8
Message ID: <199603122030.PAA05252@jekyll.piermont.com>
Reply To: <199603122027.MAA10600@netcom8.netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-13 01:05:27 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:05:27 +0800

Raw message

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:05:27 +0800
To: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Subject: Re: Remailer passphrases
In-Reply-To: <199603122027.MAA10600@netcom8.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199603122030.PAA05252@jekyll.piermont.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bill Frantz writes:
> >Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchanges have the property known as
> >"Perfect Forward Secrecy". Even if the opponent gets your public keys
> >it still will not decrypt any traffic for him at all -- it just lets
> >him pretend to be you. Thats one reason why protocols like Photuris
> >and Oakley use the technique.
> 
> Unless I am badly mistaken, these exchanges need interaction, which makes
> them unsuitable for simple remailers.

Well, actually, you can play similar tricks with El Gamal...

Perry





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