1996-03-29 - Re: WSJ on Big Java Flaw

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From: dmacfarlane@zip.sbi.com (David Macfarlane)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: e19a6c6efeb4f2875c237bf581a2ab506860e504be712dca10919d772a1c5fa8
Message ID: <9603271351.AA18267@zip_master2.sbi.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-29 14:15:30 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 29 Mar 1996 22:15:30 +0800

Raw message

From: dmacfarlane@zip.sbi.com (David Macfarlane)
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 1996 22:15:30 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WSJ on Big Java Flaw
Message-ID: <9603271351.AA18267@zip_master2.sbi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[snip]
> >    Mr. Felten said that unscrupulous people who discovered the
> >    flaw could boobytrap a Web page on the Internet,
> >    essentially seizing control of the browser software of any
> >    PC that tapped into that page. At that point, the hackers
> >    could read or delete an entire hard disk of data files.
> >    "The consequences of this flaw are as bad as they can be,"
> >    he said.[..]
>
> The generalized halting problem comes to mind...
>
> Since it can be proved that there's no complete set of heuristics
> to tell if a given program has a characteristic (such as "secureness")
> then sooner or later someone will discover another security flaw.
>
> A question is whether a simple patch is made or if the set of heuristics
> is widened (ie, learn from mistakes) so that similar flaws can be found
> based on knowledge of that one flaw.

Since this Java error is probably deep in the bytecode interpreter,
the question is will Sun patch this *particular* problem, still allowing
others, or will it have to rewrite the interpreter so that it enforces
the language more rigorously?  They are under pressure to make a
"quick fix" (they've promised something in two days), but real
security needs to be built in to a system from the ground up,
with disciplline and thorough design.  If they need to redesign their
approach to implementing the bytecode interpreter, that could take
weeks, months?

BTW, its a testament to security through code review, as the Princeton
team probably could not have discovered this deep flaw without looking
through the code.

	David Macfarlane.





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