1996-05-04 - Re: Why Leahy is No Friend of Ours

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From: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
To: tcmay@got.net
Message Hash: 59d2211fbedc2db13a438b4a0576527d115998669ddde956d38cf36387f8b847
Message ID: <01I4A4XI53G48Y56P8@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-04 07:21:19 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 4 May 1996 15:21:19 +0800

Raw message

From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Sat, 4 May 1996 15:21:19 +0800
To: tcmay@got.net
Subject: Re: Why Leahy is No Friend of Ours
Message-ID: <01I4A4XI53G48Y56P8@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"tcmay@got.net"  3-MAY-1996 19:48:00.78

>Leahy is no friend of ours. Recall that he chaired the hearings on the
>FBI's "Digital Telephony" massive wiretap proposal, and co-sponsored the
>legislation (with former FBI agent Don Edwards).

	Fascinating. I'd still say to use PGP when sending mail when possible
in order to give the NSA more to worry about in traffic analysis. However, it
does look like Leahy isn't exactly a governmental type to whom I wish to send
an encouraging message. This may explain the problems with his initial bill
on cryptography export.

>The implications for the Internet and for increasingly popular "Internet
>phone" systems are interesting. As I understand the DT language, such
>systems would have to be made compliant with wiretap requests, or face the
>$10K/day penalties. This could force many ISPs, in the U.S. of course, to
>take steps to immediately restrict certain programs, or even
>[speculatively] force them to become compliant by some form of key escrow,
>where they would keep a copy of a key for presentation to law enforcement.
>[More speculation by me: the combination of the Wiretap Act, the
>Anti-Terrorism Act, and the still-ongoing work on key escrow (TIS is still
>pushing their system, Lotus hasn't backed down, Denning still says it's
>needed, etc.) could mean that ISPs move to restrict use of crypto in
>various ways, possibly mandating escrowed encryption.

	Why do you think I enquired about encryption in the Internet Phone
software in Netscape? Deployment of such as soon as possible - with the
encrypted version being the default, or even automatic - would be a decided
help.

>Several of us (Black Unicorn, Duncan Frissell, me, etc.) may point out the
>practical difficulties involved in such enforcement, and the longterm dim
>prospects for success. But the fact is that ISPs are a kind of "choke
>point" for halting certain things. I have a feeling I know what my ISP will
>say if he gets a court order and a $10,000 per day penalty faces him. Those
>who access the Net directly, through their own companies and/or by having
>boxes hanging directly on the Net, will be less vulnerable to this kind of
>pressure. But the Netcoms, PSI, Earthlinks, AOLs, and such will likely run
>into  trouble the first time a court order is presented to make certain
>Internet phone conversations tappable....

	One question is whether the ISP will be able to detect whether someone
is violating such a law.
	-Allen





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