cryptoanarchy.wiki

Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1996-07-26 - Re: Twenty Bank Robbers – Game theory:)

Header Data

From: Paul Foley <mycroft@actrix.gen.nz>
To: gary@systemics.com
Message Hash: 24c16d58648adb6eaef81a6784af2ce61929c9cd54c46376a1e0dcd564270ca0
Message ID: <199607261138.XAA12217@mycroft.actrix.gen.nz>
Reply To: <31F89692.167EB0E7@systemics.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-26 14:54:50 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 22:54:50 +0800

Raw message

From: Paul Foley <mycroft@actrix.gen.nz>
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 22:54:50 +0800
To: gary@systemics.com
Subject: Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
In-Reply-To: <31F89692.167EB0E7@systemics.com>
Message-ID: <199607261138.XAA12217@mycroft.actrix.gen.nz>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gary Howland <gary@systemics.com> wrote:

   > No. Robber 18 knows that he will be killed under those circumstances, so he
   > proposes that Robber 20 gets all the money. 20 votes with him. 

   I think many are assuming that the cypherpunk making the suggestion
   gets a vote.  My reading of the puzzle is that he does not.

I hadn't thought of that.  If the proposer gets no vote, and assuming
he still gets counted to make up 50%, for N > 3, he should suggest
giving some money to the penultimate ceil(N/2) robbers.  In the case
of N <= 3, the last robber gets everything.

-- 
Paul Foley <mycroft@actrix.gen.nz>       ---         PGPmail preferred

	   PGP key ID 0x1CA3386D available from keyservers
    fingerprint = 4A 76 83 D8 99 BC ED 33  C5 02 81 C9 BF 7A 91 E8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fine day to work off excess energy.  Steal something heavy.

Thread