1996-07-26 - Re: Twenty Bank Robbers – CLARIFICATION

Header Data

From: bryce@digicash.com
To: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Message Hash: a101f8cea1884953cbe81bfa265410d72fc3ce12937ff5ae37fee22f18995742
Message ID: <199607261520.RAA13570@digicash.com>
Reply To: <199607261359.GAA05920@jobe.shell.portal.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-26 18:22:33 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 27 Jul 1996 02:22:33 +0800

Raw message

From: bryce@digicash.com
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 1996 02:22:33 +0800
To: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Subject: Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
In-Reply-To: <199607261359.GAA05920@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199607261520.RAA13570@digicash.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



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 Someone like Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com> wrote something like: 
>  
> Here it is for three people:
>
> #1 (first in line) proposes that he gets it all.  #1 votes yes, #2
> probably votes no (since he will get it all if the proposal fails, by
> the above) and #3 (end of line) reasons like this: if the proposal
> fails, he (#3) will get nothing because #2 will get it all.  Therefore
> voting yes or no makes no difference to whether #3 stays alive (his
> first priority) or how much money he makes (his second priority).  But
> it does make a difference in terms of keeping as many people alive as
> possible (his third priority).  So he votes yes because of this third
> reason.  Therefore the proposal passes and the first person in line
> gets it all in this case.
>
> Of course, #1 could have offered some money to #3 and gotten his vote,
> but that would violate the terms of the problem: #1 wants to make as
> much money as possible.  And since he can get #3's vote even while
> offering nothing to him, that is what he will do.
   
  
Well this isn't quite true because the cypherpunks are 
apparently allowed to change their votes based upon how their 
votes will effect other cyhpherpunks' votes.  So #3 can vote 
"No" on "#1 gets it all" proposals because he knows that #1 
_knows_ he will vote "No" on "#1 gets it all" proposals and thus
#1 will instead give #3 some money.
 
 
So if you are going to play it that way then you have to be sure
that none of your cypherpunks are allowed to think about the 
possibility that their own (probable) voting will affect their
companions' voting.


Regards,

Bryce




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