1996-08-24 - Re: Anonymous Remailers

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From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 6a30ad7286317d7b4a1b2cb80da57bcdde7078f25f0593a72e092e51711496ec
Message ID: <ae43a86a01021004d0a8@[205.199.118.202]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-08-24 03:59:43 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 24 Aug 1996 11:59:43 +0800

Raw message

From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 24 Aug 1996 11:59:43 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <ae43a86a01021004d0a8@[205.199.118.202]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 7:52 PM 8/23/96, Chris J Samuelson wrote:
>When you mail an item through more than one anonymous remailer, how does
>that make it anymore anonymous, or doesn't it?

When only a single remailer is used, the remailer can see the mapping
between the sender and the receiver.

When two remailers are used, the first remailer can see the sender, but not
the final recipient. The second remailer can see the final recipient, but
not the original sender. Of course, the two remailers can get together and
"collude," thus deducing the mapping between sender and recipient.

With N remailers, the likelihood of collusion amongst the N remailers is
less likely, possibly extremely unlikely. This is the core theory of mixes,
or remailers.

(And of course one can include one's self as a remailer, to further
increase one's confidence that collusion has not occurred.)

--Tim May


We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









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