1996-08-08 - RE: Internal Passports

Header Data

From: jbugden@smtplink.alis.ca
To: John Deters <jad@dsddhc.com>
Message Hash: d302261e8f381674aa775710d67b754c2eaaf3fbc2b4514c278e3d98f1ebb28f
Message ID: <9607078394.AA839458951@smtplink.alis.ca>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-08-08 01:29:38 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 09:29:38 +0800

Raw message

From: jbugden@smtplink.alis.ca
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 09:29:38 +0800
To: John Deters <jad@dsddhc.com>
Subject: RE: Internal Passports
Message-ID: <9607078394.AA839458951@smtplink.alis.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




----------
From:   John Deters <jad@dsddhc.com>
Sent:   Wednesday, August 07, 1996 3:35 PM
To:     James Bugden
Subject:        RE: Internal Passports

At 11:39 AM 8/7/96 EST, jbudgen@alis.com wrote:
>
>I've seen the same problem in a department store in Ottawa. They would not
>accept a Canadian Passport as identification for payment by cheque but would
>accept various credit cards and similar devices.
>
>My conclusion was that they wanted something that would show my friend's credit
>worthiness, not prove his identity.

John Deters <jad@dsddhc.com> wrote:
>On the whole, though, I have been finding that people ascribe all sorts of
>paranoid evils to all sorts of organizations, when the ultimate truth
>usually starts out more like a Dilbert cartoon.  Internally, I can usually
>spot the truly evil corporate deception practices.  Externally, though,
>people can only make guesses based on actions that they've become party to.
>And who can blame someone for that?

In the case cited above, I confirmed with the store's credit department that a
Canadian passport was not considered a valid piece of ID. I suggested that this
was due to credit concerns but they denied this. For obvious reasons, I did not
believe them.

My opinion is that a rule that stated "two pieces of ID that showed credit
worthiness" was either too complicated or too unpalatable to use. Instead, the
rule is "two pieces of ID" with the definition of ID tacitly restricted to items
that indicate credit status. Either that, or Canadian passports are too easy to
get forged in Ottawa.

This "keep it simple stupid" approach showed itself this week when I attempted
to order replacement cheques from my bank over the phone. I was told that they
needed my signature, but a signed fax request would be sufficient. I remarked
that it was trivial to apply a forged signature to a fax. The response from the
person was - wait for it - that I would then have to come in and sign for it in
person. It was impossible to convince them that this was not just a problem with
my fax machine, but a problem in general.

Eventually, I typed up a fax request in Word, pasted in my previously scanned
signature, and sent this to the bank. This made them happy, but I might be
changing banks soon.

In the physical world, a big lock or a steel door can indicate good security.
Most people can evaluate the strength of this type of security fairly well.
Until we have good analogies for the equivalent types of digital security, we
will continue to face real problems.

James






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