1996-09-05 - Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol…

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From: peter.allan@aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: be73bf5bce5d927b3d9b51f6f88fdb85475669938fe4b6d46e8a725c8eab80de
Message ID: <9609051155.AA14504@clare.risley.aeat.co.uk>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-05 16:31:37 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 00:31:37 +0800

Raw message

From: peter.allan@aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan)
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 00:31:37 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol...
Message-ID: <9609051155.AA14504@clare.risley.aeat.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




In the talk about replyable nym-mailers I haven't
yet seen netescrow mentioned.

You DID all read this ?

 > Oblivious Key Escrow
 > Matt  Blaze AT&T Research
 > mab@research.att.com
 > 12 June 1996
 > 
 > Abstract
 > We propose a simple scheme, based on secret-sharing over large-scale
 > networks, for assuring recoverability of sensitive archived data e.g.,
 > cryptographic keys. In our model any one can request a copy of the
 > archived data but it is very difficult to keep the existence of a
 > request secret or to subvert the access policy of the data owner.


This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining
the conditions under which they release their shares.  
This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer).

Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in
netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing.  The problem
of operator coercion is not addressed by this.

Police investigations might apply "angry mob cryptanalysis" to find
a sender - convincing a sizable number of operators that a crime had
been committed with some particular piece of traffic.

Anybody want to estimate traffic + storage requirements ?  Or number
of participants needed for a viable scheme ?




 -- Peter Allan    peter.allan@aeat.co.uk





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