1996-10-04 - Re: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery

Header Data

From: Dale Thorn <dthorn@gte.net>
To: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
Message Hash: 23ef87faacd5b0233702edf0b95ab01c5d21447b3a537a85d726b50d6deae480
Message ID: <3254B26B.700E@gte.net>
Reply To: <199610040153.SAA24250@slack.lne.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-04 09:03:56 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 17:03:56 +0800

Raw message

From: Dale Thorn <dthorn@gte.net>
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 17:03:56 +0800
To: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
Subject: Re: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery
In-Reply-To: <199610040153.SAA24250@slack.lne.com>
Message-ID: <3254B26B.700E@gte.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Murray wrote:
> Vladimir Z. Nuri writes:
> > cpunks, a note about recent developments in "key recovery" initiative.
> > is the government always going to be your
> > enemy, no matter what they do?

> It seems to be bent on doing so.

> > I have posted here before that many companies find the concept
> > of "key recovery" highly acceptable and even desirable. the
> > basic question is, what does this mean to wiretapping and
> > search warrants and subpoenas?

> They get served, and the keys are produced.  Same with personal
> crypto- if I'm in court and some encryped file that I have the
> key for is demanded as evidence, I provide the key or get
> hit with contempt of court, my choice.
> No one is arguing about that.  The objections to Clipper III are:

[additional text deleted]

Sounds to me like there's a need for a program that can produce secure 
encryption, yet the output looks like "real junk", i.e., not anything 
like what one of the *better* programs would produce.  Then you can 
claim (with testimony of experts if necessary) that "I didn't encrypt 
it, must be just garbage".  And even if you got some bozo govt. person 
testifying against you, you shouldn't have much problem making them look 
stupid and vindictive in front of a jury.






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