1997-02-11 - Re: anonymous remailers

Header Data

From: Jerry Basham <2ndSun@bigfoot.com>
To: “Mark M.” <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: adec5dcb6f3f8f2323d92feed7d926048d5d6c0bf416da8f4426edeb4c3b2c6d
Message ID: <199702111412.GAA19413@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1997-02-11 14:12:09 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1997 06:12:09 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Jerry Basham <2ndSun@bigfoot.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1997 06:12:09 -0800 (PST)
To: "Mark M." <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous remailers
Message-ID: <199702111412.GAA19413@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know what you're talking about.  Who is "cypherpunks," and who are
you?  Please don't answer...I'm just trying to figure out how I started
getting these wierd e-mails from people I never heard about discussing
something I never cared about.  

I truly want you to have a great life...but please leave me out of it.

----------
> From: Mark M. <markm@voicenet.com>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Re: anonymous remailers
> Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 11:11 AM
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> On Sat, 8 Feb 1997, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote:
> 
> > Ummm, if you run your own remailer, and don't get lots of people to
> > use it, then traffic analysis will reveal that you are the sender
> > quite quickly. It will pretty much make everything in the chain before
> > your remiler useless. If you send your message through remailers a, b,
> > c, and d like this:
> > 
> > you -> a -> b -> c -> d -> alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen
> > 
> > and only you use c, then your effective chain is:
> > 
> > someone who could only be you -> d ->
alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen
> 
> This is assuming that it is a reasonable assumption that all traffic
going
> through remailer c originated from the owner.  If there is one
non-corrupt
> remailer in the chain before c, then this would not be a valid assumption
> because traffic from the owner would be indistinguishable from traffic
sent
> by anyone else.  If the remailer has low traffic, the solution is, of
course,
> to make it higher traffic.  Chain a bunch of messages that get sent to
> /dev/null through the remailers, being sure to include c somewhere in the
> middle of the chain.  If Mixmaster is used, then it would be virtually
> impossible to differentiate between "real" messages and messages destined
for
> /dev/null.  It would be a little easier with Type I since the size of the
> ciphertext decreases after each hop.  This all assumes that encryption is
being
> used, of course.
> 
> 
> Mark
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